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Abstract 
This paper develops a theoretical model focusing on the effect that different neighborhood compositions can have on 
the formation of individual beliefs about economic opportunities. Specifically we highlight two effects that spatial seg-
regation may have: (1) it can efficiently separate the individual effort choices of highly and low productive individuals, 
(2) it may imply that the median voter imposes a level of redistribution that is inefficient from the aggregate point of 
view. The trade-off implies that segregated and non-segregated cities may present very similar levels of aggregate wel-
fare. We employ this framework to discuss how the structure of cities can play a role in the determination of US-type 
and Europe-type politico-economic equilibria and the implications for planning policies. 
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1. Introduction 
A large body of research across disciplines describes the 
correlation between the extent of spatial segregation—
on the basis of many factors e.g. income or race—and 
the levels of income inequality and poverty. Typically 
spatial segregation is associated with very unequal eco-
nomic outcomes, dramatic poverty levels, many social 
dimensions of deprivation and exclusion.1 According to 
standard economic theory, this pattern is not surprising 
as segregation can be explained as the spatial manifesta-
tion of economic inequality, where poverty can lead to 
segregation through market forces. If the poor can only 
afford “poor” neighborhoods, then poor people end up 
living in one place and the rich in another. Moreover, 
preferences for assimilation can re-enforce this outcome 
known as sorting, see for example Cheshire, Monastiri-
                                                          
1 A large literature documents the spatial patterns of segrega-
tion in the Western world, where deprived neighborhoods in 
most American and European cities are the typical examples. 
See for example OECD (1998), Musterd and Ostendorf (1998), 
and Kazepov (2004). 
otis and Sheppard (2003). 
We expect economic inequality and poverty to cause 
spatial segregation, but spatial segregation may in turn 
increase the extent of inequality, exacerbate poverty 
and possibly create spatial poverty traps at the neigh-
borhood level2. A recent literature in economics pointed 
to various possible causes for the existence of urban 
spatial poverty traps in developed economies: peer ef-
fects3, networks and information4, education and public 
goods5. Despite the empirical challenges in establishing a 
robust causal relationship from spatial segregation to 
                                                          
2 A spatial poverty trap is defined as a situation where “geo-
graphic capital” (the physical, natural, social, political and hu-
man capital of an area) is low and poverty is high, partly as a 
result of geographic disadvantage. In other words, in a situa-
tion of spatial poverty trap, people leaving in a poor area do 
not have physical, social or human resources to escape poverty 
and improve their socio-economic condition. See Bird, Higgins 
and Harris (2010) for a review. 
3 See for example Durlauf (1996). 
4 See for example Zenou (2013). 
5 See for example the review of Fernandez (2001). 
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poverty traps6, there are various channels by which ur-
ban segregation can negatively impact on social wel-
fare7and investigating the socio-economic effects of 
segregation remains an important question for policy.  
Our paper contributes to this research question and 
to different strands of literature by focusing on the ef-
fect that different urban structures and neighborhood 
social compositions can have on the formation of indi-
vidual beliefs about economic opportunities. More spe-
cifically, in our model individuals do not have perfect in-
formation about their economic opportunities (i.e. the 
return on effort) but can learn by observing aggregate 
outcomes in their local community. In this situation liv-
ing in a poor community will have a negative impact on 
potentially productive individuals (people with a high 
return on effort), because they will generally believe 
economic opportunities to be limited and therefore ex-
ert low effort, thereby creating a self-fulfilling poverty 
trap. The opposite outcome could happen to lowly pro-
ductive people living in a successful community, since 
they will believe the return on effort to be high and will 
therefore exert high effort, thereby helping their opti-
mist belief to be self-fulfilled. This aspect of negative or 
positive neighborhood externality on effort choices is 
similar to models of peer and network effects.8  
Our first contribution is to employ a micro-economic 
analysis to model the implications of different urban 
forms and of the extent of spatial segregation in a set-
up with neighborhood social externalities.9  
Secondly, we also model the effect that individual 
beliefs have on preferences for redistribution and we 
contribute to a novel and growing literature which—
                                                          
6 Typically endogenous sorting and the unobserved individual 
variables create a natural econometric problem of endogenei-
ty, where standard regression techniques of neighborhood 
economics outcomes against neighborhood social features 
would give biased results. Solutions have been found in large 
scale natural experiments or in advanced econometric tech-
niques based on large data-sets. See Ross (2011) for an ex-
tended review on this topic. 
7 The papers reviewed by Fernandez (2001) model various 
channels through which sorting is inefficient. For example, 
Benabou (1993) discusses the role of complementary skills, 
Benabou (1996) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) analyze 
the interaction between local school financing and the produc-
tion of human capital. 
9 This methodology can be considered as complementary to 
more traditional methodologies that have been used in the 
broad field of urban studies to address related questions, see 
for example Arbaci (2007), and Arbaci and Rae (2013) among 
others. 
8See for example Durlauf (1996), Mookherjee, Ray and Napel 
(2010), and Zenou (2013). 
9 With this respect, our methodology can be considered as 
complementary to more traditional methodologies that have 
been used in the broad field of urban studies to address relat-
ed questions, see for example Arbaci (2007), and Arbaci and 
Rae (2013) among others. 
extending a long tradition in sociology and political sci-
ence since De Tocqueville (1835)—focuses on the link 
between persistent differences in popular beliefs about 
the true extent of individual economic opportunities and 
social mobility and persistent differences in political out-
comes.10 We extend this literature by analyzing the role 
played by urban structures in the formation of beliefs 
and we highlight two effects that spatial segregation 
may have: (1) it can efficiently separate the individual 
effort choices of highly and low productive individuals, 
(2) it may imply that the voted level of redistribution is 
too high or too low with respect to social welfare. 
Thirdly, by developing a microeconomic model that 
jointly analyzes spatial segregation and politico-
economic outcomes, we contribute to a recent and 
growing interdisciplinary literature that is introducing 
new mathematical formalizations in the study of urban 
forms and policy issues for urban planning.11 The rest 
of the paper is organized through an exposition of the 
theoretical model divided in three subsections and a fi-
nal section with discussion and conclusions. All the 
technical proofs and the figures can be found in the fi-
nal appendix.12  
2. Model 
2.1. Residents and Production 
We model one city with two neighborhoods (or com-
munities) j = {1, 2}. The entire city is inhabited by a unit 
measure of residents i who work, get paid by the 
amount that they produce, pay taxes, receive public 
transfers and consume the entire net income. The indi-
vidual production function is: yi = ki + θiei, where ki is a 
given stock of resources that the agent cannot influence 
(i.e. parents’ wealth or “luck”), θi is the individual return 
on effort, ei is the individual level of exerted effort. Fol-
lowing the standard formalization in public economics 
started by Romer (1975), we assume a linear redistribu-
                                                          
10 Typically this literature has tried to explain the persistent dif-
ference between European-type welfare states and US-type 
laissez-faire societies through the role of cultural beliefs. See 
the theoretical models of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos 
(2005), Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Gabrieli (2010) on how 
multiple politico-economic equilibria (US-type vs Europe-type) 
with different beliefs are possible. See the empirical works of 
Fong (2001), Corneo and Gruner (2002), Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2005) on the evidence that such beliefs are strong determi-
nants of the demand for redistribution. See the surveys of 
Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) and Keely (2002) for a 
documentation of the cross-country differences in beliefs on 
social mobility and individual opportunities. 
11See for example the psycho-economical benefits-based mod-
els of D’Acci (2013) and D’Acci (2015) or the agent-based 
framework of Prunetti, Muzy, Innocenti and Pieri (2014). 
12 Those technical results draw from the work of Gabrieli 
(2010). 
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tion scheme where post-tax income equals wi = (1 − τ)yi 
+ y¯ and over-lined variables denote averages.13 For the 
sake of simplicity, we initially assume an individual utili-
ty function which is linear in income.14 As standard in 
the literature, we also assume a quadratic cost of effort 
to ensure that the utility is strictly concave in effort and 
hence there is a unique individual optimal effort choice. 
The individual utility function is therefore:  
(1) 
 
,
2
2i
ii eawu   
where a is the cost of effort. 
We model that a fraction π of the population has low 
“opportunities” θL and the remaining fraction 1 − π has 
high “opportunities” θH, where θH > θL. Individuals do 
not know their “true” opportunities, but may learn 
something in their neighborhood. We assume a simple 
learning mechanism: agents observe the average re-
turn on effort in the neighborhood, respectively la-
beled as θ1 and θ2, and expect this to be their return on 
effort.15 
We then model segregation through a parameter λ 
which is the fraction of θL agents living in community 1 and 
the fraction of θH agents living in community 2, which im-
plies that the fraction of θL agents leaving in community 1 
is p(θL, 1)= π λ and symmetrically p(θL, 2)= π(1 − λ), p(θH, 
1)=(1 − π)(1 − λ), p(θH, 2)=(1 − π) λ. The expected (or aver-
age) opportunity in community 1 is therefore given by and 
the one in community 2 by: 
)]1)(1(/[])1)(1([)(1   HL , 
and the one in community 2 by: 
])1()1(/[])1()1([)(2   HL . 
It is immediate to notice that θ1 and θ2 are symmetric 
with respect to λ = 0.5. By computation, we obtain an 
                                                          
13 This specification simply implies that the income is trans-
ferred with a proportional tax rate from those richer than the 
average income to those poorer than the average. 
14 Standard microeconomic analysis shows that in the case of 
linear utility a zero tax rate would maximize aggregate welfare 
and that the optimal tax rate would be positive and larger the 
more concave is the utility function. We will discuss the impli-
cations of a concave utility function later in the paper. 
15 This implies that all people living in the same neighborhood 
have the same expectation over the return on effort. We mod-
el only two neighborhoods for the sake of simplicity. The re-
sults of our analysis would not change if there were many 
neighborhoods, or equally if people were learning the average 
return on effort in smaller communities, e.g. families or other 
groups. 
intuitive proposition showing that an increase in segre-
gation increases the extent of income inequality be-
tween the two neighborhoods: 
Proposition 1: θ1 decreases in λ and θ2 increases 
in λ. 
Because of the symmetry of θ1 and θ2 with respect to λ 
=0.5, we will only consider the case of λ ∈ [0.5, 1] in the 
rest of the analysis, with the intuitive feature that in this 
case an increase in λ is equivalent to an increase in the 
degree of segregation. Therefore, in our analysis, as seg-
regation increases, θ1 decreases and community 1 be-
comes progressively less productive, while exactly the op-
posite happens in community 2. 
By the first order condition in (1) with respect to ei, 
we find that the optimal effort exerted by an individual 
who lives in community j is: 
(2) .
)1(
a
e
jj


 
Therefore, individual effort increases in the expected re-
turn on effort θj and decreases in the tax rate τ. We then 
define the aggregate output produced in the city, net of 
the distortive effective of tax, as Γ(λ), where this depends 
on the effort exerted in each community and on the true 
productivity: 
Γ(λ) = πθL(λθ1(λ) + (1-λ)θ2(λ)) + (1-π)θH((1-λ)θ1(λ) + 
λθ2(λ)). 
We then obtain the following proposition showing the ef-
fect of segregation on aggregate output: 
Proposition 2: Γ is increasing and convex in the 
degree of segregation λ. 
This result can be interpreted as the standard benefi-
cial effect of information in reducing adverse selection: 
segregation efficiently separates the effort choices of 
individuals with different productivity and prevents 
that highly productive individuals exert lower than op-
timal effort. 
2.2. Redistribution 
Plugging the individual optimal effort (2) and the ex-
pression for net income wi into the utility function (1) 
we obtain an indirect utility as a function of τ: 
(3) 
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Assuming that 2θ 2L > θ 2H , we can show that expression 
(3) is strictly concave in τ and that the individual ideal 
tax rate of an individual i, living in community j, can be 
obtained by the first order condition: 
(4) .
)(
)(
1
1),(
2





j
i
j
i
kka
k

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Assumption 1: 2θ 2L > θ 2H. 
Proposition 3: Under assumption (1), each 
individual i has a unique ideal rate of redistribution 
given by expression (4). 
We notice that expression (4) is the result of two com-
ponents. 

 )( ikka
 is the standard motive for redis-
tribution—firstly discussed by Meltzer and Richard 
(1981)—where a lower relative endowment with re-
spect to the average naturally increases the desired tax 
rate and whether progressive or regressive, such dis-
tributive goals must be traded off against distortions to 
the effort-elastic component of the tax base. Instead, 
/)( 2j is the motive from redistribution that de-
rives from believing that individual productivity is be-
low the average.16 
Following the framework of Meltzer and Richard 
(1981), as standard in the related literature, we model 
                                                          
16 This component relates to the role of beliefs in "upper mobil-
ity" firstly highlighted by Benabou and Ok (2001). 
that the voted (or equilibrium) tax rate τ coincides with 
the median tax τM, where in our case this is jointly 
identified by the distribution of k and the values of j 
and Γ which, in turn, both depend on λ.  
In order to understand the effect of segregation on 
the voted tax rate we proceed with a simple numerical 
analysis. We can think first about a case in which the 
endowment k is homogenous across individuals and 
therefore a(k¯   − ki) = 0. Given θL = 1, θH = 1.5 and π = 0.6, 
Figure 1a shows that moving from no segregation (λ = 
0.5) to maximum segregation (λ = 1) would increase 
the ideal tax rate τ (·, 1) of someone leaving in the 
poorer community, i.e. some with expected productivi-
ty θ1, from 0 to 25%. If we then set a(k¯ − ki) = 0.3, Figure 
1b shows that moving from no segregation (λ = 0.5) to 
maximum segregation (λ = 1) would increase that ideal 
tax rate from 15% to 40%. Repeating the numerical 
analysis for different parameters values, while assuring 
that τ ∈ (0, 1), does not change the fact that τ (·, 1) in-
creases in the extent of segregation λ. Hence, by nu-
merical analysis we obtain the following result: 
Proposition 4: The ideal tax rate of someone living in the 
poor community increases as the degree of segregation 
increases. Symmetrically, the ideal tax rate of someone 
living in the rich community decreases as the degree of 
segregation increases. 
In the case of homogenous endowments across indi-
viduals, k¯ = ki and therefore there are only two groups of 
voters: those in community 1 with expected productivi-
ty θ1 and those in community 2 with expected produc-
tivity θ2. In this case, it is therefore very easy to analyze 
the effect of segregation on the voted tax rate. 
 
 
(a)       (b) 
Figure 1. Effect of segregation on the ideal tax rate in community 1. Parameters: θL = 1, θH = 1.5 and π = 0.6, (A): a(k¯ − ki) 
= 0, (B): a(k¯ − ki) = 0.3. 
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Proposition 5: In the case of homogenous endowments 
across individuals, if π > 0.5 the voted tax rate increases as 
the degree of segregation increases, if π < 0.5 the voted tax 
rate decreases as the degree of segregation decreases. 
The previous proposition simply shows that with only 
two groups of voters the median voter belongs to the 
larger of the two groups and, therefore, as segregation 
makes each group respectively more and less pessimis-
tic about productivity, the ideal tax rate of the median 
voter changes.  
In the case of heterogeneous endowments across 
individuals, from expression (4) we notice that the me-
dian ideal tax rate is determined by the joint distribution 
of θj and ki. In this case, changing the level of segregation 
does not generally have a monotonic effect on the voted 
tax rate, because the distribution of ideal tax rates 
changes with the level of segregation and the ideal tax 
rate may change discontinuously.17 In principle econom-
ic opportunities and endowments are likely to be jointly 
determined and correlated through intergenerational 
transfers.18 As mentioned in the introduction, a vast lit-
erature in urban economics shows that through the 
working of land and housing markets and because of 
homophily we generally expect a positive correlation be-
tween individual wealth and likelihood of living in more 
expensive neighborhoods. Therefore in our model we 
expect people living in the richer neighborhood to have 
larger endowments. Provided that those endowments 
are not too heterogeneous across the neighborhoods, 
the effect of segregation on the voted tax rate would still 
be the one described by Proposition 5. 
Summarizing the analysis of redistribution, our mod-
eling of segregation captures the situation of many cities 
where large inequality of opportunities is correlated 
with wealth and income inequality across different 
neighborhoods of the city. The effect of segregation that 
we have analyzed is to separate the voters into two 
groups with different opinions about the return on ef-
fort, i.e. the scope for social mobility. Depending on the 
underlying distribution of economic opportunities (the 
value of π) Proposition 5 shows that one group of voters 
will be the majority and impose its ideal tax rate. 
From the previous analysis there are two possible 
dynamics describing the effects of an increase of the 
degree of segregation in a city. The first one is one in 
which the disadvantage group, the one with θL, is in the 
majority and more segregation could increase the pre-
vailing tax rate by making this majority group more 
pessimistic about economic opportunities. This could 
be interpreted as the dynamic in cities with a small rich 
                                                          
17 See chapter II of Gabrieli (2009) for a detailed analysis of this 
case. 
18 A full characterization of that dynamic process is beyond the 
scope of this paper and a related analysis can be found in Ga-
brieli (2012). 
area and where the middle and lower class live along-
side in larger and more diverse areas; in this case 
greater segregation would increase the poor popula-
tion in the poorer area and increase their desire for re-
distribution. 
The second dynamic is one in which the disad-
vantage group is in the minority and more segregation 
decreases the prevailing tax rate by making the majori-
ty richer group more optimistic about economic oppor-
tunities. This could be interpreted as the dynamic in 
cities with small deprived areas and where more seg-
regation makes the middle and upper class less em-
pathic with those poor areas. 
Although in our model we do not explicitly model 
land or housing markets, referring to standard theory 
we would expect wealthier individuals to be located in 
the richer area. Including intergenerational transfers 
would therefore imply a correlation between produc-
tivity and endowments and would further separate the 
two groups. This can be interpreted as the effect of 
private housing markets where the best neighborhoods 
can only be afforded by the wealthiest. In this case we 
could even have a situation where the poorest are so 
excluded that some of them do not vote.19 If this is the 
case more segregation could decrease the level of redis-
tribution because some of the voters among the disad-
vantage group may not vote and those in the wealthier 
neighborhood may become the majority group. 
2.3. Welfare 
Given the effects of segregation on the voted tax rate, it 
is now a natural question to analyze the effect of segre-
gation on the aggregate welfare of the city. For the sake 
of simplicity, we begin the analysis by using a standard 
aggregate welfare function equal to the average utility, 
i.e. the expected value of (3) in the economy, condi-
tional on the degree of segregation λ. Noticing that the 
expected value of (θj)2 for the economy is given by ex-
pression (3) we find that the expected value of the indi-
vidual utility, i.e. the expression for aggregate welfare, 
given the degree of segregation: 
(5) .2/)())(1()( 2 akuE i    
As it is always with linear utility, a zero tax rate maxim-
izes aggregate welfare because in the expression redis-
tribution does not have benefits, being a pure transfer 
of resources between citizens that all weight equally 
for aggregate welfare, but at the same time redistribu-
tion has a social cost because it decreases optimal ef-
fort. We will also discuss the case of concave welfare 
function, where the welfare-maximizing tax rate is pos-
                                                          
19 See Benabou (2000) for a related analysis of the effects of 
extreme inequality on the voting behavior of the poor. 
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itive or more simply a Rawlsian welfare function where 
a positive tax rate maximizes the utility of the most 
disadvantage group. 
We notice that in expression (5) the value of λ affects 
both the prevailing tax rate τ and the aggregate product 
of effort Γ. Proposition 2 has illustrated that Γ monoton-
ically increases with the degree of segregation and 
Proposition 5 has shown that the effect of segregation is 
monotonic on the voted tax rate τ. For this reason, the 
effect of segregation on aggregate welfare (5) is not a 
priori clear and there can be a trade-off effect of seg-
regation in the case in which increasing segregation in-
creases (or decreases) the voted tax rate above (or be-
low) the welfare maximizing level, while it surely 
increases the component Γ. A full mathematical char-
acterization of the effect of λ on expression (5) is be-
yond the scope of this paper, but can be found in the 
results of Gabrieli (2010). The results show that in the 
case in which the tax rate increases with segregation, 
the overall effect of segregation on the expression of 
ex-ante utility (5) is to either monotonically decrease 
welfare or monotonically decrease it up to a point and 
then monotonically increase it. 
This result implies that either no segregation (λ = 
1/2) or full segregation (λ = 1) can maximize aggregate 
welfare (5). We present some numerical examples for 
this general property. 
Figure 2a shows a case with homogenous endow-
ments and Figure 2b shows a case with heterogenous 
endowments and discontinuous change of the median 
voter. Figure 3 shows a case with concave utility func-
tion where the welfare maximizing tax rate would be 
positive. In the figures we notice that the parameters 
have been chosen in such a way that no segregation (λ 
= 1/2) or full segregation (λ = 1) are equally optimal for 
aggregate welfare.20 Numerical exercises show clearly 
                                                          
20 While the set of parameters such that both λ =1/2 and λ =1 
that by increasing the underlying heterogeneity among 
the groups, i.e. increasing τ or increasing the difference 
θH - θL, implies that segregation is relatively more bene-
ficial, i.e. the value of (5) for λ = 1 increases relatively to 
the value of (5) for λ = 1/2. 
The intuition behind this result is that increasing the 
degree of segregation has a trade-off effect on welfare: 
on one hand it improves the allocation of individual ef-
fort (increasing Γ) but on the other hand it may raise re-
distribution beyond the efficiency level, therefore (5) 
does not increase monotonically in λ. Secondly, the con-
vexity of Γ (Proposition 2) implies that (5) is either mon-
otonically decreasing or quasi-convex, hence the two 
corner welfare-maxima. The possibility of both no seg-
regation and full segregation being welfare-maxima can 
be interpreted as indicating that cities with small dif-
ferences in the parameters π, θL, θH may find very dif-
ferent levels of segregation to be optimal. 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper we developed a microeconomic model of 
the effects that different urban forms and sizes of 
neighborhoods (or smaller community groups) can 
have on the joint dynamics of individual effort choices 
and prevailing rates of redistribution by explicitly mod-
eling the role that urban forms have for the determina-
tion of societal beliefs regarding economic opportuni-
ties. With the model we were able to quantify the 
implications of different degrees of segregation on po-
litico-economic variables: aggregate output, prevailing 
rate of redistribution and aggregate welfare. 
                                                                                           
are global maxima of (5) has zero measure, it follows that there 
are sets with positive measure such that both λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 
are local maxima. Also in the case of concave utility we can 
equally have examples where no segregation is welfare maxim-
izing. 
  
(a)        (b) 
Figure 2. Effect of segregation on aggregate welfare (multiple optima). (a) Parameters: θL = 1, θH = 1.5, π = 0.76, a=0.5, − 
ki) = 0. (b) Parameters: θL = 1, θH = 1.5, π = 0.8, (k¯ a=0.4, a(k¯ − ki) = 0.4. 
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Figure 3. Case of concave utility function. Parameters: θL = 1, θH = 1.5, π = 0.8, a=0.4, a(k¯ − ki) = 0.4 
According to the model, an increase in the degree of 
segregation implies that beliefs about economic oppor-
tunities become more heterogeneous across different 
neighborhoods, with people in poor neighborhoods 
having pessimistic beliefs about the return on effort 
and the scope for social mobility, while people in richer 
neighborhoods hold opposite beliefs. This separating 
effect is beneficial to aggregate output simply because, 
on average, individuals become better informed about 
their return on effort and therefore effort is more effi-
ciently allocated between people with high and low 
opportunities.21 
Although efficient from the perspective of aggre-
gate output maximization, segregation increases in-
come inequality across neighborhoods and this implies 
other effects. Allowing for intergenerational transfers 
would imply that individual endowments and return on 
effort are to some extent correlated22 and this would 
further increase the extent of both income and wealth 
inequality across neighborhoods. Moreover, private 
housing markets where high bids from wealthy individ-
uals can outbid poorer individuals would, in turn, imply 
that a modest initial degree of segregation can pro-
gressively increase over time through the implied 
wealth and income inequality that segregation fosters. 
The model then shows that income inequality natu-
rally increases the desired tax rate of poor people 
through the well-known Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
                                                          
21 This beneficial effect would generally be more limited in 
models with complementary skills, see for example Benabou 
(1993). 
22 For example through investments in the human capital of 
children. 
motive for redistribution and therefore the unequal ef-
fects of segregation could in principle be corrected by 
higher voted redistribution. Nevertheless, in the model 
beliefs about economic opportunities which are 
formed in the neighborhood are also shown to affect 
the desired tax rate. The interaction of those two mo-
tives for redistribution is studied through numerical 
examples and segregation is shown to generally in-
crease the desired tax rate of those living in poorer 
neighborhoods and decrease the desired tax rate of 
those living in richer neighborhoods.23 
Although the effect of segregation on the individual 
ideal tax rate is quite clear to quantify, the determina-
tion of the prevailing tax rate imposed by the median 
voter is less clear because of discontinuous changes in 
the distribution of ideal tax rates. Two different dy-
namics are shown to be possible. In one possible dy-
namic, the majority of the population lives in the poor-
er neighborhood and more segregation increases the 
prevailing tax rate by making this majority group more 
pessimistic about economic opportunities, thus partial-
ly correcting the extent of income inequality. In a sec-
ond possible dynamic, the majority of the population 
lives in the wealthier neighborhood and more segrega-
tion decreases the prevailing tax rate by making the 
majority group more optimistic about economic oppor-
tunities, thus contributing to even more unequal eco-
nomic outcomes. The prevailing dynamic therefore de-
pends on the urban form. The first one would be the 
case in cities with a small exclusive rich areas and 
where the middle and lower class live alongside in a 
                                                          
23 This is in line with the empirical findings of Bailey, Gannon, 
Kearns, Livingston and Leyland (2013). 
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larger and more diverse areas; the second one would 
be the case in cities with small very deprived areas and 
where the middle and upper class live alongside in a 
larger areas. 
Finally, by taking into account the joint effect of seg-
regation on aggregate output and redistribution we ana-
lyze aggregate welfare. With this respect, a critical varia-
ble is represented by the definition of welfare function, 
where it is a standard result of microeconomics that the 
more concave the welfare function is then the larger the 
welfare-maximizing tax rate is, just like it would be the 
case with a Rawlsian welfare function that aims to max-
imizes the utility of the most disadvantage group. De-
spite the specific welfare function, we find that increas-
ing the degree of segregation generally has a trade-off 
effect on welfare since, on the one hand, it improves the 
allocation of individual effort but, on the other hand, it 
may increase (or decrease) redistribution away from the 
efficient level. This trade-off effect implies that both no 
segregation and full segregation can be welfare-optimal 
for the same city and that small differences in the heter-
ogeneity of the initial distribution of opportunities may 
justify very different levels of segregation.  
This final result may be used to interpret the docu-
mented lower redistribution rate in the US relative to 
European countries, where societies with similar initial 
“parameters” may find different levels of segregation 
to be optimal. In particular, the lower taxation in the 
US may be explained by a median voter that lives in a 
wealthier community and may overestimate her own 
abilities. Although stuck in different planning and polit-
ical outcomes, the two societies may have similar levels 
of welfare.24 
Our results have interesting implications for the 
analysis of planning policies. We show that the effect 
that different urban forms and neighborhoods social 
mixes have on voted redistribution has large quantita-
tive effects on social welfare and therefore this effect 
should be accounted for in policy analysis. We also 
show that because the effect of segregation on voted 
redistribution is not monotonic, also the effect of seg-
regation on welfare is generally not monotonic. Never-
                                                          
24 Despite the fact that modeling a unique redistribution rate is 
a natural way to study different attitudes towards redistribu-
tion across countries, more specific city-level taxation mecha-
nisms could also be studied. For example one may consider an 
alternative system imposing different levels of taxes for resi-
dents in different neighborhoods. One could also contrast this 
system to a more market-based redistribution mechanism 
based on subsidized land or house prices. In the present model 
even with different types of redistribution mechanism we 
would still have the trade-off effect of segregation on welfare, 
because segregation would still improve effort allocations but 
possibly raise redistribution over the optimal level. Neverthe-
less different redistribution mechanisms would generally give 
different quantitative results. We thank an anonymous referee 
for this interesting suggestion for future research. 
theless we show that as long as the ideal rate of redis-
tribution is positive, given land and housing market 
forces that naturally push towards full segregation, 
planning policies that preserve socially mixed neigh-
borhoods can maximize welfare. 
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Appendix. Proofs. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The monotonic behavior is immediately proved from the computation of the first derivative with respect to λ : 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
In order to prove the monotonicity, it is enough to compute the expression of the first derivative of Γ with respect to λ : 
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which is ≥ 0 for λ ≥ ½. 
In order to prove the convexity, it is useful to compute the expression of the second derivative of Γ with respect to λ: 
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The expression is positive as it can be proved that the term (1 + 12π λ (1 − λ )(1 − π )—3π (1 − π) 3λ (1 − λ )) (call this X) is strict-
ly positive. To see this, compute the first derivative with respect to λ which is equal to 3(2π  − 1)2(2λ  − 1) and therefore posi-
tive. Hence the term X increases in λ; it is immediate that X is equal to zero for the smallest value of λ, i.e. λ  = 1/2. Therefore 
for any value of π and λ, X is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The second derivative of the objective function (3) is equal to: 
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The condition stated by Assumption 1 is sufficient for the expression to be strictly negative as the maximum value that 
θ 2 j can take is θ 2H and the minimum value that 2Γ can take is 2θ 2L.  
Proof of Proposition 4 
Proved by the numerical analysis reported in Figure 1. 
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Proof of Proposition 5 
If π  > 1/2, since λ  ≥  0.5, the majority of the population is the group of θL agents living in community 1, i.e. p(θL,1) = π λ  
> 0.5. Their ideal tax rate τ (·,θ1) increases in λ by the previous proposition. Symmetrically, if π < 1/2, since λ ≥  0.5, the 
majority of the population is the group of θH agents living in community 2, i.e.   
p(θH, 2) = (1 − π )(1 − λ) > 0.5. Their ideal tax rate τ(·,θ2) decreases in λ by the previous proposition. 
